linkedin.com
Solid. A couple of things could still be tighter. 1 item below, ordered by how much inbox it is costing you. Measured 0s ago from public DNS in 80 ms.
Fix these, in this order, or hand the list to your agent
ranked by impactSelector google._domainkey is under 2048 bits, which some receivers already downgrade.
Do this: rotate to a 2048-bit key at the sending service.
Records found
10 mail-c.linkedin.com
10 mail-d.linkedin.com
20 mail-a.linkedin.com
20 mail.linkedin.com
Fix this with your AI agent
AGENT-READYA prompt built only from what was measured: the records as published, 1 task in order, exact record values and Azure DNS commands, guardrails, and how to verify. Paste it into Claude, Cursor, Copilot or ChatGPT.
# Fix email authentication for linkedin.com You are working on the DNS and mail configuration for linkedin.com. Measured by MailAuthWatch on 17 Oct 2026 from public DNS. Grade A (95/100). Report: https://www.mailauthwatch.com/check/linkedin.com ## What is published right now (do not assume anything else) - SPF (TXT linkedin.com): v=spf1 ip4:199.101.162.0/25 ip4:108.174.3.0/24 ip4:108.174.6.0/24 ip4:108.174.0.0/24 ip6:2620:109:c00d:104::/64 ip6:2620:109:c006:104::/64 ip6:2620:109:c003:104::/64 ip6:2620:119:50c0:207::/64 ip4:199.101.161.130 mx mx:docusign.net ~all — valid, 2 of 10 lookups - DMARC (TXT _dmarc.linkedin.com): v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:d@rua.agari.com,mailto:yfy3q-9359@rua.dmarc.emailanalyst.com; ruf=mailto:d@ruf.agari.com - DKIM: google._domainkey (1024-bit) - MX: mail-1.linkedin.com, mail-c.linkedin.com, mail-d.linkedin.com, mail-a.linkedin.com, mail.linkedin.com → a custom mail host - Nameservers: dns1.p09.nsone.net, dns2.p09.nsone.net … → records are managed in Azure DNS ## Tasks, in order of impact …
Grade history
SPF OK
v=spf1 ip4:199.101.162.0/25 ip4:108.174.3.0/24 ip4:108.174.6.0/24 ip4:108.174.0.0/24 ip6:2620:109:c00d:104::/64 ip6:2620:109:c006:104::/64 ip6:2620:109:c003:104::/64 ip6:2620:119:50c0:207::/64 ip4:199.101.161.130 mx mx:docusign.net ~all
- DNS lookups
- 2 of 10 allowed
- Final mechanism
~all
- OK No problems detected.
DKIM OK
DKIM selectors cannot be listed from DNS, so 79 selectors used by common providers were probed.
| Selector | Key | Record |
|---|---|---|
google | RSA 1024-bit Weak | v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCLhE5uHP4DCQPLBtQNWwX2rvKIxmdgrYvd… |
- WarningDKIM selector "google" uses a 1024-bit key. Rotate to 2048 bits.
- NoteSelector "dk" is published with an empty key (decommissioned). Harmless as long as nothing signs with it.
DMARC OK
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:d@rua.agari.com,mailto:yfy3q-9359@rua.dmarc.emailanalyst.com; ruf=mailto:d@ruf.agari.com
- Policy
p=reject- Applies to
- 100% of failing mail
- Aggregate reports
mailto:d@rua.agari.commailto:yfy3q-9359@rua.dmarc.emailanalyst.com
- OK No problems detected.
Mail exchange and extras
- OK No problems detected.
- MTA-STS
- Not published optional: enforces TLS for inbound mail
- TLS-RPT
- OK
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsreports@linkedin.com - BIMI
- OK
v=BIMI1; l=https://media.licdn.com/media/AAYQAQQhAAgAAQAAAAAAABrLiVuNIZ3fRKGlFSn4hGZubg.svg; a=https://media.licdn.com/media/AAYABAQhAAgAAQAAAAAAAYFI0DP_wvHFSv6mYduMZuEwSA.pem;
How the grade is calculated
Score 95/100. SPF present and valid. SPF ends with ~all. DKIM found (1 selector). DMARC present and valid. DMARC policy is reject. DMARC aggregate reporting enabled. SPF contributes up to 35 points, DKIM up to 25, DMARC up to 40 (policy strength and reporting). Any critical issue caps the grade at C. Lookups that failed are shown as "not measured" and never counted as missing.
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Other recently graded domains
Public checks from the last few days. Every report is re-measured from DNS when opened.