mail.ru
Solid. A couple of things could still be tighter. 1 item below, ordered by how much inbox it is costing you.
Fix these, in this order
ranked by impactSelector mail2._domainkey is under 2048 bits, which some receivers already downgrade.
Do this: rotate to a 2048-bit key at the sending service.
Records found
Grade history
SPF OK
v=spf1 redirect=_spf.mail.ru
- DNS lookups
- 1 of 10 allowed
- Final mechanism
~all
- OK No problems detected.
Include tree
1 / 10DKIM OK
DKIM selectors cannot be listed from DNS, so 79 selectors used by common providers were probed.
| Selector | Key | Record |
|---|---|---|
mail2 | RSA 1024-bit Weak | v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC8msGcERt9i1AqEs6Dl5n0btBDj4W3IjzN… |
- WarningDKIM selector "mail2" uses a 1024-bit key. Rotate to 2048 bits.
DMARC OK
v=DMARC1;p=reject;rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@corp.mail.ru;
- Policy
p=reject- Applies to
- 100% of failing mail
- Aggregate reports
mailto:dmarc_rua@corp.mail.ru
- OK No problems detected.
Mail exchange and extras
- OK No problems detected.
- MTA-STS
- OK
v=STSv1; id=20260715T120000; - TLS-RPT
- OK
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:tls-rpt@corp.mail.ru - BIMI
- Not published optional: brand logo in inboxes, requires p=quarantine or reject
How the grade is calculated
Score 95/100. SPF present and valid. SPF ends with ~all. DKIM found (1 selector). DMARC present and valid. DMARC policy is reject. DMARC aggregate reporting enabled. SPF contributes up to 35 points, DKIM up to 25, DMARC up to 40 (policy strength and reporting). Any critical issue caps the grade at C. Lookups that failed are shown as "not measured" and never counted as missing.
Check another domain:
Other recently graded domains
Public checks from the last few days. Every report is re-measured from DNS when opened.