gmail.com
2 fixes stand between this domain and a clean A. 2 items below, ordered by how much inbox they are costing you. Measured 0s ago from public DNS in 76 ms.
Fix these, in this order, or hand the list to your agent
ranked by impactEither DKIM signing is off, or it uses a selector we did not probe. Without DKIM, forwarded mail and anything that breaks SPF fails DMARC.
Do this: in Google Admin go to Apps → Google Workspace → Gmail → Authenticate email, generate a 2048-bit key with selector "google", publish the TXT record, then click Start authentication.
You are collecting reports and enforcing nothing, so anyone can still send as you. Gmail and Yahoo accept p=none from bulk senders, but it protects nobody.
Do this: move to p=quarantine; pct=25 for two weeks, watch the reports, then step to pct=100 and p=reject.
Records found
10 alt1.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com
20 alt2.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com
30 alt3.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com
40 alt4.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com
Fix this with your AI agent
AGENT-READYA prompt built only from what was measured: the records as published, 2 tasks in order, exact record values and Google Cloud DNS commands, guardrails, and how to verify. Paste it into Claude, Cursor, Copilot or ChatGPT.
# Fix email authentication for gmail.com You are working on the DNS and mail configuration for gmail.com. Measured by MailAuthWatch on 17 Oct 2026 from public DNS. Grade C (55/100). Report: https://www.mailauthwatch.com/check/gmail.com ## What is published right now (do not assume anything else) - SPF (TXT gmail.com): v=spf1 redirect=_spf.google.com — valid, 1 of 10 lookups - DMARC (TXT _dmarc.gmail.com): v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=quarantine; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com - DKIM: no key found under 79 common selectors - MX: gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com, alt1.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com, alt2.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com, alt3.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com, alt4.gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com → Google Workspace - Nameservers: ns2.google.com, ns4.google.com … → records are managed in Google Cloud DNS ## Tasks, in order of impact …
Grade history
SPF OK
v=spf1 redirect=_spf.google.com
- DNS lookups
- 1 of 10 allowed
- Final mechanism
~all
- OK No problems detected.
Include tree
1 / 10DKIM Not found
DKIM selectors cannot be listed from DNS, so 79 selectors used by common providers were probed. "Not found" means none of those selectors exist; the domain may still sign with a custom selector.
- WarningNo DKIM key found under 79 common selectors. If you know your selector, add it to the check; if you have no DKIM at all, enable it at your mail provider.
DMARC OK
v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=quarantine; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com
- Policy
p=none· subdomainssp=quarantine- Applies to
- 100% of failing mail
- Aggregate reports
mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com
- WarningPolicy is p=none: you receive reports but spoofed mail is still delivered. Move to p=quarantine, then p=reject, once reports show legitimate mail passing.
Mail exchange and extras
- OK No problems detected.
- MTA-STS
- OK
v=STSv1; id=20190429T010101; - TLS-RPT
- OK
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:sts-reports@google.com - BIMI
- Not published optional: brand logo in inboxes, requires p=quarantine or reject
How the grade is calculated
Score 55/100. SPF present and valid. SPF ends with ~all. DMARC present and valid. DMARC policy is none (monitoring only). DMARC aggregate reporting enabled. SPF contributes up to 35 points, DKIM up to 25, DMARC up to 40 (policy strength and reporting). Any critical issue caps the grade at C. Lookups that failed are shown as "not measured" and never counted as missing.
Check another domain:
Other recently graded domains
Public checks from the last few days. Every report is re-measured from DNS when opened.